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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a reality where the justice system operates like
a stock exchange. Envision that system as permitting investors
to buy percentages of a plaintiff’s harm as an investment
opportunity. Further, contemplate that system as employing
algorithmic tools to determine the likelihood of a lawsuit’s
success for financing purposes. Now look around. On August
22, 2016, Eva Shang, a Harvard attendee turned entrepreneur,
unveiled her startup—Legalist—for a crowd of potential
investors in Mountain View, California.1 Legalist is a litigation
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finance company that uses a technologically-driven method to
select, vet, and invest in litigation.2 Legalist, unlike its
competitors,3 uses an electronic algorithm “to calculate the
likelihood that a lawsuit will succeed, the company then invests
in cases it deems promising. If a plaintiff it has funded prevails,
Legalist takes a percentage of the winnings—usually between
twenty-five and thirty percent [sic].”4
The reality is that our judiciary has shifted. Legalist, and
litigation finance start-ups like it, are the most recent in a
twenty-year-string of advances made in third-party litigation
finance (“TPLF” or “litigation lending”). The age-old doctrines
of maintenance and champerty5 are all but forgotten,6 and an
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-litigationfinance-is-really-about.
2 LEGALIST, http://www.legalist.us (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
3 Legalist is one of many finance firms across the globe investing in
U.S. litigation. See also, JURIDICA, http://juridica-aml.com (last
visited Nov. 17, 2016); BURFORD CAPITAL LTD.,
http://www.burfordcapital.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); CREDIT
SUISSE, http://www.credit-suisse.com/us/en.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2016); AMERICAN LEGAL FUNDING,
http://www.americanlegalfunding.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016);
ADVOCATE CAPITAL, INC., http://www.advocatecapital.com (last
visited Nov. 17, 2016); COUNSEL FINANCIAL,
http://www.counselfinancial.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016);
EVERGREEN FUNDING GROUP, http://www.evergreen-funding.com
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016); LAW FINANCE GROUP, INC.,
http://www.lawfinance.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); OXBRIDGE
FINANCIAL GROUP LLC, http://www.oxbridgefg.com (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016); RAPID FUNDS, http://rapidfunds.com (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016); RD LEGAL CAPITAL, http://www.legalfunding.com
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016); VIA LEGAL FUNDING,
http://www.vialegalfinance.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
4 Hunt, supra note 4; see also Kalajdzic et. al., infra note 11, at 131
(quoting a Baker McKenzie representative stating that the “typical
[investors fee] would be between twenty and fifty percent of the
damages, with a cap of three to four times the legal costs advanced
by the funder”).
5 See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance §§ 1-2 (2017) (defining
maintenance and champerty as claims of “officious intermeddling”).
6 See generally ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE, 11-12 (2012), available at
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investment-based litigation finance system has replaced them.7
While the dramatic shift to embrace litigation financing may
seem bizarre in a vacuum, there is no doubt that the stated
motivations of the litigation lending movement are
meritorious.8 It is undeniable, however, that the bedrock of the
movement—for-profit capital investment—is potentially
disagreeable in this context due to its propensity to raise ethical,
evidentiary, adversarial, and representational concerns.
TPLF works fine for the individual plaintiff. If an
individual chooses to sell her potential recovery from a suit,
why should our justice system prohibit it? American legal
principals allow individuals to sell their structured settlements
in favor of buy-out incentives.9 Moreover, our judiciary
encourages risk/reward type sophistication when determining
the value of a lawsuit.10 The economic foundation on which all
legal decisions are made incentivizes unique problem solving

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/e
thics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_infor
mational_report.authcheckdam.pdf. (reporting that 27 out of 51 U.S.
jurisdictions now permit some form of champerty or maintenance in
situations of third party funding).
7 Id.
8 See Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman, and Alana Longmoore,
Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and
U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 94 (2013)
(citing New York City Bar Gives Thumbs Up to Litigation-Funding,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (June 20, 2011), http://archivecom.com/page/481471/2012-1019/http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011
/06.
9 See generally J.G. WENTWORTH, https://www.jgwentworth.com
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016); PEACHTREE FINANCIAL,
http://www.peachtreefinancial.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016);
SELL MY ANNUITY, http://www.sellmyannuity.net/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2017).
10 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. § 13 (codifying the practice of
crossclaim and counterclaim practice); 1 ALT. DISP. RESOL. § 7:1 (3d
ed. 2016) (identifying the duties arising from arbitration
agreements).
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techniques to promote judicial frugality.11 Separate from
“individual TPLF,” however, is third-party aggregate litigation
finance (“TPALF”)—the next step for litigation financiers.12
While it is true that the costs associated with aggregate
litigation are far more than those associated with individual
litigation, so too are the complications that arise during multiparty, multi-jurisdiction lawsuits. For numerous reasons,
applying TPLF to the practice of aggregate litigation fails to
comport with the established legal norms in the U.S. The legal
issues that arise when investors attempt to finance aggregate
claims include—e.g. the exacerbation of privilege and
confidentiality concerns inherent in complex litigation; the
ability for aggregate defendants and other improper parties to
invest in their opposing party claims; and the advancement of
non-party interests—distinguish themselves as particularly
unjustifiable.
This article will explore the above-mentioned
deficiencies of permitting TPLF in the aggregate context and
ask whether applying litigation finance to aggregate claims is
worth the risk of violating U.S. ethical and evidentiary rules,
diluting adversarial principals, and creating representational
concerns. Part I will outline the rise of litigation finance in the
U.S. and briefly identify representative instances of individual
TPLF and TPALF here in the states. Part II will identify three
primary concerns presented by the creation of third party
lending arrangements in aggregate litigation and briefly
explain why each threatens the legitimacy of aggregate
litigation. Finally, Part III proposes a blanket prohibition on
TPALF arrangements pending the implementation of a

See generally 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 7 (2016)
(discussing mediation-arbitration arrangements); See Thomson
Reuters Practical Law, Settlement Release of Claims Agreement.
PRACTICAL LAW LABOR & EMPLOYMENT (2016).
12 See Kalajdzic et. el., supra note 11, at 127 (explaining that while the
TPLF market in the U.S. is a few decades old, “there does not appear
to have been a reported instance of TPLF in the class actions
context.”)
11
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comprehensive regulatory scheme accounting for the concerns
facing aggregate litigation lending.

II. THE SPARK THAT IGNITED LITIGATION LENDING
In the early history of law, there was a strong
feeling not only that . . . the judges and two
litigants [] were necessary [for a legal dispute]
but that there must be no one else and that
anyone who intruded himself between the judge
and the parties could only mean mischief.13
Problematically however, individuals who appeared before
their peers “flanked by supporters” were traditionally believed
to have “dignity and power,” whereas individuals “not so
supported”
appeared
traditionally
“miserable”
and
“wretch[ed] in the literal sense of both words.”14 For this and
similar reasons, early legal systems created a caveat to the judge
and two litigant rule to allow “intervention on behalf of
another.”15 Throughout legal history, these third party
intervenors (litigation speculators) have been looked upon with
suspicion.16 In feudal England, Parliament developed the
doctrines of “maintenance” and “champerty” to circumvent
these suspicions.17 As was to be expected, English influence on
U.S. law fostered the adoption of maintenance and champerty
as a part of the early U.S. common law.18
Champerty is defined as the “officious intermeddling in
a suit by a stranger by maintaining or assisting either party with
money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it.”19 Maintenance
Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935)
(detailing the development of maintenance and champerty).
14 Id. at 49. (discussing early Greek judiciaries and judiciaries
throughout the middle ages).
15 Id. (this encompassed the attorney and various other supporters).
16 See generally id.
17 Id. at 70.
18 Id.
19 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (2016) (“[i]n order to
establish a prima facie case of champerty, three elements must exist:
13
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“is an officious intermeddling in a suit that in no way belongs
to the intermeddler, by maintaining or assisting either party
with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.”20 The
purpose of these doctrines was to deter “financial overreaching
by a party of superior bargaining position” and disincentivize
the “bringing of frivolous lawsuits.”21 With the development of
the statutory law in the U.S., however, “maintenance [was] lost
[to] such specific torts as slander, libel, conspiracy, [and]
malicious prosecution.”22 And, the antiquated doctrine of
champerty has been almost completely outmoded by the
contingency fee, a public policy against excessive fee recovery,
sanctions for misconduct,
and the doctrines of
unconscionability, duress, and good faith.23 Even without
maintenance and champerty, U.S. courts have been able to
consider the excessiveness of fee arrangements and whether
financiers impermissibly influence the outcome of a lawsuits.
Ultimately, the development of the U.S. statutory law posed
whether the doctrines of maintenance and champerty were
necessary.
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said more than a
century ago,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that so it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.24

the party involved must be one who has no legitimate interest in the
suit; the party must expend its own money in prosecuting the suit;
and the party must be entitled by the bargain to share in the
proceeds of the suit” quoting WFIC, LLC v. LaBarre, 148 A.3d 812,
818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)).
20 Id. at § 2.
21 Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997).
22 Radin, supra note 16, at 59.
23 Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1227.
24 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (Jan. 8,
1897).
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As a reflection of Justice Homes’s sentiment, many states have
made the determination to abolish, repeal, or ignore25 the
doctrines of maintenance and champerty. The shift mirrors the
“change in [the societal] attitude toward the financing of
litigation”26 and represents the realization that “agreements to
purchase an interest in an action may actually foster resolution
of [] dispute[s].”27 Some jurisdictions still prohibit maintenance
and champerty in some capacity, but the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions have recognized the social utility of third party
litigation funding arrangements.28
As a product of the deregulation of litigation lending,29
and in conjunction with the American contingency fee, a system
of TPLF developed within the United States to capitalize on the
practicality and profitability of legal risk-shifting agreements.

A. UNITED STATES TPLF AND A FAILED ATTEMPT AT
TPALF

In some states maintenance was never adopted or has been
abandoned. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863);
Fastenau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173, 1174-1175 (Colo. 1952); Grant v.
Stecker & Huff, Inc., 1 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Mich. 1942); Bentinck v.
Franklin, 38 Tex. 458, 472-73 (1873). In others, the doctrine has been
given very narrow interpretation. See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11,
13 (Or. 1891); Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415, 416-17 (1823); See
generally ABA, supra note 9.
26 Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1226.
27 Id.
28 Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the
Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 801 (2003-2004)
(pointing to New York, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma as three of the
jurisdictions that either statutorily prohibit maintenance and
champerty or do so as a part of their common law); see also ABA,
supra note 9.
29 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 134-35 (explaining the
deregulation of maintenance and champerty in the U.S. in
comparison to that of other countries, such as Australia. In Australia,
maintenance and champerty are no longer torts or criminal offenses.
By contrast, the United States has relatively few judicial decisions
addressing these issues directly.); See also ABA, supra note 9.
25
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As the legislative and judicial predisposition towards
litigation lending changed in the United States, so too did the
perception of foreign and domestic investors. Among the most
explicit litigation financiers entering the U.S. market over the
last two decades are Juridica, Burford Capital Ltd., American
Legal Capital, Advocate Capital, Inc., Counsel Financial,
Evergreen Funding Group, Law Finance Group, Inc., Oxbridge
Financial Group LLC, Rapid Funds, RD Legal Capital, and Via
Legal Funding.30 In addition to the bevy of litigation finance
firms saturating the market, individual investors31 and novel
start-ups, such as Legalist, regularly affect U.S. litigation.32
“Investors are pumping unprecedented sums of money into
financing litigation, lured by the prospect of payoffs untethered
to economic or market conditions.”33 “To litigation funders, a
lawsuit is [now] more than a dispute; it is an asset, just like any
other receivable.”34 In its 2015 annual report, a representative of
Burford Capital LLC, a publicly traded global finance firm,
acknowledged that, “It may seem strange to think of litigation
[as an asset], but if one strips away the drama and collateral
dynamics associated with the litigation process, a litigation
claim is nothing more than an effort to get money to change
hands.”35
Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States,
RAND INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER, 13, 23 (2010) (in 2010, at least
four new litigation funders entered the market); see William Alden,
Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/lookingto-make-a-profit-on-lawsuits-firms-invest-in-them/.
31 Sorkin, infra note 40.
32 Lisa Rickard and Mark Behrens, Opinion: 3rd-Party Litigation
Funding Needs Transparency, LAW360 (Oct. 17, 2016)
http://www.law360.com/articles/852142/opinion-3rd-partylitigation-funding-needs-transparency (discussing TPLF trends).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.; Problematically only a few states have enacted legislation
restraining the otherwise untethered practice of TPLF. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (2009) (allowing restricted TPLF and striking
down the Ohio Supreme Court case of Rancman v. Interim
Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003) where the
30
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While the intricacies of each litigation lending
arrangement may vary dramatically across the spectrum of
litigation lending cases (many of which are never revealed), the
case of Boella v. Gawker Media, LLC36 offers a representative
instance of how TPLF works in some U.S. jurisdictions. Terry
Gene Boella (a/k/a Hulk Hogan) sued Gawker Media in 2012
for releasing, without his consent, footage of an adulterous
encounter between himself and a married woman.37 A Florida
jury awarded Boella $140 million in personal injury damages
for invasion of privacy.38 Unbeknownst to the judge, jury,
opposing counsel, or Gawker, however, Boella received pretrial financial support from an outside investor to insure that he
could go the distance with Gawker.39 Tech billionaire Peter
Thiel invested $10 million in Boella’s lawsuit, providing him
with the funding to oppose the profitable online media
company.40 Thiel described his interest in financing Boella’s
claim as a “philanthropic” venture against journalistic bullying
and underscored that he did not “expect to make any money
from [the investment].”41 Due to Thiel’s negative personal
relationship with Gawker, however,42 some believe that the
Silicon Valley billionaire had a potential agenda driven by
Court found an arrangement of maintenance that disincentivized
settlement practices); see also 9-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 9-A, §§
12-104, 12-106.
36 Boella v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d. 1325 (M.D. Fl.
2012).
37 Id. at 1326.
38 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire, Reveals Secret War
with Gawker, THE N.Y. TIMES, (May 25, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business/dealbook/peterthiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html?r=0.
39 Id.
40 Id. (Thiel is Silicone Valley entrepreneur, a co-founder of PayPal
and one of the first investors in Facebook).
41 Id.
42 Id. (In 2007, Gawker’s Valleywag blog published an article
headlined “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people” essentially “outing
Thiel as gay.” Owen Thomas, Peter Thiel is totally gay, people,
GAWKER: VALLEYWAG, Dec. 19, 2017,
http://gawker.com/335894/peter-thiel-is-totally-gay-people).
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revenge, personal dislike, or principal.43 While Thiel denies that
his investment in Boella’s claim was retaliatory, it is more likely
that his personal dealings with Gawker had some role to play
in his decision making process.44
The Boella-Thiel arrangement has many characteristics
typical of an American TPLF agreement. In general, an
agreement of this type is fairly simple,45 requiring only that an
investor evaluate the risk of an individual lawsuit and propose
a return for her support, usually in a nonrecourse loan.46 It
involves only an investor and a holder of a claim.47 Its details
remain shrouded in secrecy, as the general terms were revealed
only after the conclusion of litigation.48 The expediency with
which such arrangements can be made is surprising. In TPLF
determinations, “funders minimally screen claims to determine
whether to offer funding” in a routinized business model
“handling a high volume of similar cases without much, if any,
individualized treatment”49 With the success and profitability50
Id.
Id. (Regardless, we will never know. Due to the lack of TPLF
regulation, there is no requirement that the motives of third party
investors be discussed or investigated).
45 Legalist, supra note 6 (visit the website of any litigation lender and
you will find that it promises a “cash now” pledge in return for a
nonrecourse promise to pay a percentage of the potential damage
award); It should be noted that the nonrecourse nature of litigation
loans, while not the subject of this article, is key to bypass usury
(lending money at an unusually high rate) law.
46 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financing of Class
Action Litigation in the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L.
REV. 499 (2014).
47 See id. at 501-02. (outlining a distinction between individual tort
lending and commercial lending).
48 See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d. 626 (Fl. 2005)
(representing a situation where the litigation lending arrangement
was revealed because the holder of the claim refused to pay the
investor); Sorkin, supra note 41 (Thiel’s involvement in the Gawker
litigation only revealed itself after the jury verdict. The existence of
many of these arrangements are likely never reveled).
49 Hensler, supra note 49, at 502.
50 Id. (noting that investors are drawn to the market by its potential
for high rates of return per claim on a large volume of loans).
43
44

RISK-FILLED RISK AVERSION

57

of TPLF in the U.S., such as the Theil-Boella one, investors now
have an eye toward expanding TPLF to aggregate and
commercial claims.
Due to the secrecy (and potentially the uncertainty) of
litigation lending arrangements, there are few examples of
American litigation lending in the aggregate context.51 One
such example, however, exists in the form of the Ecuadorian
environmental damages litigation against Chevron—Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc.52 In Aguinda, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York refused to certify a class on behalf of
Ecuadorian residents of the Amazon.53
After nine years of litigation in federal court, the
suit was dismissed on forum non conveniens.
Two years later, a new suit arising out of the
same factual allegations was filed in Ecuador by
a group of Ecuadorians that included some of
the original class representatives . . . . [T]he
provincial court in Sucumbíos, Ecuador issued
an $18 billion judgement against Chevron,
which was upheld (although ultimately slashed
in half) by Ecuador’s appellate court. By 2010
Chevron was back in the U.S. courts, pursuing
charges of fraud in the Ecuadorian litigation,
seeking a preemptive injunction against
enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment, and
ultimately bringing RICO charges against
[plaintiffs’ counsel]. . . . In late 2010, with
plaintiffs' attorney [] apparently having
depleted his resources and the Ecuadorian
Hensler, supra note 49, at 505 (“It appears that only one class action
initiative in the United States has secured third-party litigation
financing”); Kalajdzic et. at., supra note 11, at 127 (stating that “there
does not appear to have been a reported instance of TPLF in the class
actions context”).
52 Hensler, supra note 49, at 505 (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994)).
53 Id. (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 626–27
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.
1998)).
51
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provincial court in Sucumbíos yet to deliver its
judgment, Patton Boggs received $4 million in
funding from third-party litigation financer
Burford Capital Ltd. to take over the case. Patton
Boggs LLP, a fifty-year-old Washington, D.C.
firm that describes itself as a “public policy” law
firm with roots in international trade and
business law, agreed to represent the
Ecuadorian plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis.
. . . Burford was said to have committed a
maximum of $15 million to the litigation and
reportedly hedged its investment by selling the
initial $4 million share to another entity. A year
later, Burford announced that it would not
invest further in the Ecuadorian litigation. . . .
Chevron's lawyers filed a letter dated September
2011 from Burford to [the plaintiffs’ attorney]
accusing him and the plaintiffs of fraud,
pursuant to Chevron's ongoing RICO litigation
against [the plaintiff’s attorney]. Burford
subsequently charged that [a member of Patton
Boggs, LLP] had provided the firm with a
misleading analysis of the case.54

Id. (citing citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Chevron
Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, UNCITRAL
Arbitration, Interim Award (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0150.pdf; citing also, Chevron Corp. v. The Republic
of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, UNCITRAL Arbitration,
Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita01550.pdf; PRESS RELEASE, AMAZON WATCH, CHEVRON
GUILTY VERDICT UPHELD BY ECUADOR APPELLATE COURT, Jan. 4, 2011,
available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0104-chevronguilty-verdict- upheld-by-ecuador-appellate-court; Steven Donziger,
et al., Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited: The Clash of Human Rights and BIT
Investor Claims: Chevron's Abusive Litigation in Ecuador, HUM. RTS.
BRIEF, Winter 2010, at 8; Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune,
NEW YORKER, January 9, 2012, at 38; Michael Goldhaber, The Global
54
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The attempted application of TPLF to the aggregate BoggsBurford arrangement left in its wake lawsuits against the
plaintiffs and the original plaintiffs’ counsel, Steven Donziger,
for fraud; tortious interference allegations against Chevron for
improperly influencing the class investor, Burford;55 and
substantial monetary and public-image losses for the investor,
Burford.56
While the Burford TPALF arrangement seems like an
exaggerated worst-case scenario for TPALF investors,57 it
illustrates the complex array of issues that arise when applying
TPLF to aggregate litigation. The utter failure of the Burford
arrangement, one of the only public instances of TPALF in the
U.S.,58 has deterred many investors from “flock[ing] to [] high-

Lawyer: Latest Twists in Chevron's Amazon Case Run Through Latin
America, AM. LAW. (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?
id=1202578138704&The_Global_Lawyer_Latest_Twists_in_Chevrons
_Amazon_Case_Run_Through_Latin_America); Alison Frankel, Can
Ecuadorean Plaintiffs Keep Funding Case Against Chevron?, REUTERS
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2011/12/12/can-ecuadorean-plaintiffs-keep-funding-caseagainst-chevron/; Roger Parloff, Litigation Finance Firm in Chevron
Case Says It Was Duped by Patton Boggs, CNN MONEY, Apr. 17, 2013,
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/17/burford-pattonboggs-chevron-suit/).
55 Id. quoting James Tyrell, Jr., Paton Boggs, LLP, “Chevron made it
clear that there would be repercussions if [Burford] continued [its]
funding.”).
56 Id. (these arrangements are secretive that we may never know of
the exact value of the losses sustained by Burford).
57 See Tyler W. Hill, Financing the Class: Strengthening the Class Action
Through Third-Party Investment, 125 YALE L.J. 484, 528 (2015)
(providing a sarcastic recognition of the negative value suit by a
TPALF proponent).
58 See also Binyamin Appelbaum, Betting on Justice; Putting Money on
Lawsuits, Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010).
(Describing the non-class World Trade Centre Respiratory Illness
lawsuit brought on behalf of ground zero workers funded by
Counsel Financial in the form of a loan to Napoli Bern LLP. The case
eventually settled for $712.5 million, and the lenders earned
approximately $11 million).

60

5 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2017)

value mass litigation against multinational corporations.”59
However, the success of TPALF in Australia, Canada, and the
U.K.,60 and the profitability of individual TPLF arrangements in
the U.S, has encouraged investors and scholars alike to
rationalize TPALF practice with U.S. law.61 Even though the
particular effect TPLF and TPALF arrangements have had on
the U.S. market is difficult to quantify due to their secretive
nature, the “marked increases in the number of funders
entering the market” over the last decade clarifies that the
litigation lending business is booming.62

III. TRANSITIONING FROM TPLF TO TPALF
In theory, the same reasoning that applies to TPLF
should also apply to TPALF arrangements. Although
champertous, TPALF arrangements, like their individual TPLF
counterparts, radiate at least a modicum of social usefulness.63
Unlike TPLF arrangements, though, TPALF agreements
implicate ethical, evidentiary, adversarial, and representational
concerns not contemplated in the individual TPLF context.
In theory, there are four categories of investment within
the world of U.S. litigation finance.64 The first category is TPLF

Hensler, supra note 49, at 507 (stating “Juridica has consistently
stated that it will not provide financing for class action lawsuits”).
60 See generally, Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11 (for the differences in
U.S., Canadian and Australian TPLF).
61 See generally supra note 3 (for several scholarly attempts to
rationalize TPALF with U.S. law).
62 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 127.
63 See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997)
(explaining the social usefulness of litigation lending arrangements).
64 Other authors propose that only three distinct categories of TPLF
arrangements exist. But see Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 128-29
(citing Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway?: Third Party
Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); Garber, supra note
33; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1306 (2012); ABA, supra note 9, at
7).
59
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“fee investing.”65 TPLF fee investing occurs when an investor
personally finances an attorney or her law practice in return for
a percentage of the attorney’s fees in a case. Second, TPLF
“relief investing” occurs when an individual claim holder sells
a portion or all of her potential relief to an outside investor to
shift the risk of loss.66 Third, TPALF “fee investing” usually
occurs in the class action context when class counsel receives
funding from a third party investor to survive class certification
and/or litigation.67 In return, the outside investor receives a
percentage of the attorney’s contingency fee.68 Finally, TPALF
“relief investing” only differs from TPLF relief investing in
scope.69 Where TPLF relief investing involves one claim holder
with one claim, TPALF relief investing is repeated many times
with many aggregate claim holders.
Each of these investments, while similar, pose their own
unique legal hurdles when contemplated in the context of a U.S.
based lawsuit.70 For example, TPALF fee investing
arrangements, if revealed, may have implications on a judge’s
lead counsel determination, either positively or negatively.71
TPLF fee investment arrangements, do not affect a judge’s
Id. at 128 (referring to this type of investing as “loans to lawyers or
law firms”).
66 Id. (referring to this type of loan as a “nonrecourse loan made
directly to [the] plaintiff”).
67 Id. (referring to this type of loan as “funding of complex or
commercial claims”).
68 See generally id.
69 Id. (Kalajdzic et. al. either contemplates this category of investment
within TPLF “relief investing” or fails to recognize the separation
between aggregate plaintiffs and individual plaintiffs. I bifurcate
here to reflect the fundamental differences in aggregate plaintiffs
and individual plaintiffs as well as the distinct issues that arise when
applying TPLF to each).
70 See generally id. (explaining the differences between the U.S.,
Australian, and Canadian approach to TPALF, including Canadian
TPLF disclosure requirements and the Australian abolishment of the
contingency fee and its use of a “loser pays” adversarial system).
71 Id. at 133-34 (citing a conversation with Ralph Sutton, CEO of
Bentham Capital, stating that when a law firm discloses its need for
third party financing to support its representation, it impairs its
chances of being selected as lead counsel in a class action).
65
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determination of counsel. Similarly, the individual consent of
the claim holder exists as an ethical barrier in TPLF relief
investing arrangements.72 However, due to the nature of
aggregate claims, an attorney entering into a TPALF relief
investing arrangement should be required to gather the consent
of all similarly situated claimants before entering into the
arrangement.73
While there are deficiencies in TPLF fee and relief
investing (category one and two),74 the shift away from
maintenance and champerty toward litigation lending acts as
society’s recognition and acceptance of those deficiencies.
However, TPALF fee and relief investing arrangements present
countless insufficiencies that cannot be overcome by the social
utility of risk sharing arrangements. Difficulties such as the
perpetuation of false class support and the risk of higher
recovery for undeserving classes,75 and the political attack on
contingency fee litigation remain in the background of almost
every TPALF discussion.76 The most glaring concerns that
TPALF arrangements implicate, however, are
(A) the
exacerbation of privilege and confidentiality issues inherent in
See generally ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §
1.6 (explaining that client information can be shared with a third
party with the informed consent of the client).
73 See generally id.; Hensler, supra note 49, at 515 (proposing that
judicial oversight and Rule 23(e)(3) could cure this specific
perplexity).
74 Specifically, the traditional normative concerns about maintenance
and champerty, and the lack of transparency inherent in these
arrangements. See Rickard et. al., supra note 35.
75 See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,
1200 (2013) (recognizing what Professor Hensler calls the “in
terrorem effect of class actions” and their propensity to affect the
settlement of frivolous class actions); but see Hensler, supra note 49, at
511 (theorizing the non-existence of a rise in frivolous class action
settlements).
76 See JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD PARTY LITIGATION
FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpar
tylitigationfinancing.pdf; see also Hensler, supra note 49, at 511-12
(acknowledging, and rejecting, similar TPALF concerns).
72
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aggregate litigation; (B) the ability of aggregate defendants and
other improper parties to invest in their opposing party’s claim;
and (C) the advancement of non-party interests to the detriment
of claim holder.

A. THE EXACERBATION OF PRIVILEGE AND
CONFIDENTIALITY CONCERNS INTRINSIC IN COMPLEX
LITIGATION
Investing is not gambling. Gambling requires only that
an individual hedge a bet relying on luck and/or chance for a
return. Investing requires thoughtful analysis of information.
Investopedia explains that
[t]rue investing doesn't happen without some
action on [the part of the investor]. A ‘real’
investor does not simply throw his or her money
at any random investment; he or she performs
thorough analysis and commits capital only
when there is a reasonable expectation of profit.
Yes, there still is risk, and there are no
guarantees, but investing is more than simply
hoping Lady Luck is on your side.77
The larger the risk (aggregate claims are structurally risk laden),
the more information an investor must gather to make a
comfortable investment. Litigation investment is no different. 78
Capital investments by sophisticated investors, which are the
type of investors that would be interested in funding an
Investopedia Staff, Investing 101: What Is Investing?, INVESTOPEDIA
(2017),
http://www.investopedia.com/university/beginner/beginner1.asp
#ixzz4PxLviQsz.
78 This Article primarily focuses on “for-profit investing,” and, as a
default position, presumes as much of third-party litigation
financing. The author does recognize that all investing is not based
on capital profit. Spirted advocates eager to subsidize religious,
ethical, and moral movements - regardless of capital profit - may
invest in litigation to achieve a non-capital outcome. This type of
“nonprofit investing”, however, seems rare amid the profit driven
litigation lenders entering the U.S. TPLF market. See supra note 6.
77
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aggregate claim, are driven by the availability of data and
information. Ethical and evidentiary concerns arise when the
data and information sought by investors is confidential and/or
privileged.

i. ETHICAL CONCERNS PRESENTED BY THE
DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL AGGREGATE
INFORMATION
In the individual TPLF context many of the ethical woes
presented by the privilege and confidentiality doctrines can be
cured by giving notice to, and receiving consent from, the claim
holder.79 Distributing notice and receipt of consent, however,
become painstakingly challenging in the context of TPALF fee
investing, and insufficient in the context of TPALF relief
investing. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require
that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent.”80 The rule does not distinguish between aggregate
and individual claimants, thus if privileged information is
disseminated in an aggregate fee investing arrangement, the
attorney must first have consent from all affected claimants.
When there are hundreds (if not thousands) of claimants across
numerous jurisdictions with varying degrees of interest in the
claim, notifying and receiving consent from all claim holders
before entering into an information/data based fee investing
arrangement is very unlikely, but necessary under the ethical
rules.81
The relationship that develops between a claim holder
and a relief investor may also require consent from other
similarly situated claimants. Depending on the identity of the
investor, the motivations behind the relief investing
arrangement, the information/data required by the investor,
See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.6
(including an exception to disclose confidential information with
consent of the client).
80 Id.
81 Id.
79

RISK-FILLED RISK AVERSION

65

and the characteristics of all other similarly situated claimants,
the relief investing arrangement could severely disadvantage
other claimants.82 To avoid conflict among aggregate claimants,
consent is required of all claimants before distinct
information/data based TPALF relief investing arrangements
may be entered into.83

ii. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS PRESENTED BY THE
DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
In their article Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding,
Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic, Dr. Peter Cashman, and Alana
Longmoore characterize the integrity of the lawyer-client
relationship primarily as an “ethical concern.”84 While the
intervention of a third party into the attorney-client relationship
raises ethical issues (discussed in PART II. A. i.),85 these
arrangements present equally problematic evidentiary
concerns. Violating the ethical duty of confidentiality and/or
the breach of privilege might cause formal disciplinary
proceedings by the American Bar Association,86 but the
evidentiary implications of breaching confidentiality and
privilege will produce a legal malpractice lawsuit.87
It is axiomatic within the legal profession that all
communications between the attorney and client are protected
by the attorney-client privilege.88 Likewise, all documents
See id. at 1.7 (stating “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest”); See also
Part II C.
83 Id. at 1.7(b)(4); See generally MoneyForLawsuits V LP v. Rowe, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43633 (E.D. Mich. March 29, 2012) (as an example of
a relief investing arrangement within an aggregate claim).
84 Kalajdzic et al., supra note 11, at 134.
85 See ABA, supra note 92.
86 Id. at 8.4.
87 John T. Seale, Legal Ethics: A New Column, 42 LA. B. J. 283 (1994)
(briefly discussing the distinction between misconduct and
malpractice).
88 FED. R. EVID. 502.
82
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prepared in anticipation of litigation are protected as
confidential by the attorney work product doctrine.89 All attorneyclient communications and work product created in
anticipation of litigation are protected from discovery.90 A
privilege does not exist, however, for attorney-investor or
investor-claimant communications, nor does there exist a
doctrine to protect investor work product from prying eyes. In
theory, when an attorney propagates privileged or confidential
information to an investor it becomes discoverable.91
Clever attorneys have attempted to circumvent
discovery by utilizing the “common interest exception” to the
attorney-client privilege. The common interest doctrine was
originally contemplated to “permit[] represented parties who
shared a common legal interest to exchange privileged
information in a confidential manner for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice without waiving the attorney-client
privilege” (emphasis added).92 This exception was usually
reserved to allow co-defendants an opportunity to exchange
privileged information.93 The extension of the common interest
exception to third-party litigation funders has been met with
mixed reactions. In Leaders Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware rejected
“the common interest exception to [the] attorney-client
privilege and ordered disclosure of documents shared with
funders during discussions about potential TPLF
arrangements.”94 In Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics,
Id.; ABA, supra note 90.
FED. R. EVID. 502.
91 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 136 (noting that confidentiality
and nondisclosure agreements do not insulate information from
discovery).
92 Katherine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Priviege: Why the
Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix
It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (2005).
93 Id. at 51.
94 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 137 (citing Leader Technologies,
Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010)); see also Bray
& Gillespie Management LLC v. Lexington Insurance Co., 2008 WL
5054695, 2 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
89
90
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Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas “found that disclosure of such documents to potential
funders did not waive work product privilege.”95 The “question
of whether any communication with the [investor] would be
protected by privilege is also unsettled”96
In a recent article, the CEO of Burford Capital,
Christopher P. Bogart, shrugged off the evidentiary concerns
presented by disclosing confidential information to litigation
financiers.97 According to Bogart, “several decisions have
recently confirmed that work product shared with a litigation
financier under a confidentiality agreement remains
privileged.”98 While facially true, Bogart’s statement must be
contextualized. Bogart as the chief executive officer of one of the
largest litigation financing firms in the world obviously harbors
a bias toward the subject. More problematically, Bogart’s selfserving article fails to mention the existence of conflicting case
law, and runs contrary to statements by other litigation
investment firms that have indicated that they do not actively
seek access to information within the scope of the attorneyclient privilege when performing due diligence prior to funding
a claim.99 Regardless of its context, Bogart’s article reveals an
important aspect of TPLF (and logically TPALF) arrangements
- both proponents and opponents of TPALF recognize that
Kaljdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 137 (citing Mondis Technology Ltd.
v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011)).
96 Kaljdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 136 (citing Bray & Gillespie Mgmt.
LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 6:07CV222-ORL-35KRS, 2008 WL 5054695,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008).
97 Christopher P. Bogart, The Case for Litigation Financing, 42 LITIG. 46,
49 (2016).
98 Id.
99 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMENTS TO ALTERNATIVE
LITIGATION FINANCING WORKING GROUP ISSUES PAPER, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_
build/ethics_2020/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_is
sues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf (ALFA, Juridica and Oasis Legal
Finance have all indicated that they do not seek access to
information covered by the attorney-client privilege when
performing due diligence prior to funding a claim).
95
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investors cannot accurately calculate risk without the
dissemination of privileged and/or confidential information.100
Whether this dissemination subjects attorneys and claimants to
the risk of evidentiary exposure is far more unclear than Bogart
suggests. As with many aspects of litigation lending, this
uncertainty becomes even more indefinite when considered in
the vacuum of TPALF where extensive case law does not exist.

B. REVOLUTIONIZING RISK MITIGATION THROUGH
IMPROPER INVESTMENT
The lack of transparency that defines almost every TPLF
and TPALF arrangement in the U.S.101 makes it almost
impossible to determine who is actually investing in litigation.
In his article Auctioning Class Settlements, Professor Jay
Tidmarsh identifies “five types” of potential TPALF investors,
which he calls bidders.102 First, and most obvious, law firms
may choose to invest their internal resources to continue
litigation.103 Second, private equity firms (i.e. litigation lenders)
could emerge as a potential class of investors engaged in the
financing of claims.104 Third, consumer advocacy groups or
other nonprofit groups may invest in a claim with an interest in
regulating the defendant’s conduct.105 Fourth, the defendant’s
competitors may invest in a plaintiff’s claim to affect the
economic market in which the defendant and the competitor

See generally Hensler, supra note 49, at 518 (recognition TPALF’s
incompatibility with the doctrines of privilege and confidentiality by
a TPALF supporter); see also Bogart, supra note 109, at 49.
101 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 128 (distinguishing between
disclosure requirements in Canada and the lack of such
requirements in the U.S.).
102 Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
227, 257 (2014) (Professor Tidmarsh identifies 5 categories of
“bidders” but the same categories can be used to identify the types
of “investors” that may pursue TPALF).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
100
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operates.106 And, finally, the defendant itself may invest in a
plaintiff’s claim to more effectively allocate risk.107
As a fundamental principal of law in common law
countries—including the United States—legal disputes must be
adversarial.108 If any investor, other than a law firm, finances a
legal claim, it should raise suspicion of whether that investor
has an ulterior motive, including—but not limited to—
pecuniary gain, for her involvement in the lawsuit. The
potential for adversarial abuse has grown exponentially with
the introduction of litigation lending in the United States,
because litigation lending firms may be owned by
multinational corporations109 or operate under various
subsidiaries,110 the probability of someone with a nonadversarial or economic incentive to exist on both sides of the
transaction is more likely than ever.
Professor Tidmarsh, in discussing his proposition of a
class settlement auction,111 simply dismisses the notion that a
defendant would want to bid against her own settlement offer,

Id.
Id.
108 But see Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of
Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial” Stems: France, Italy, and
Germany, 87 YALE L. J. 240 (1977) (distinguishing common law
judiciaries from inquisitorial judiciaries where the court takes an active
role in investigating facts).
109 See Binyamin Applebaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors
Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html?p
agewanted=all&_r=0. (disclosing that Counsel Financial is believed
to be owned by Citigroup); but see counselfinancial.com (failing to
mention its relationship to Citigroup).
110 See BURFORD CAPITAL, LLC,
http://www.burfordcapital.com/burford-capital-llc-2016/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2017). (stating that it operates through subsidiaries
in numerous countries. Note that the website fails to outline the
distinctions between Burford entities).
111 Tidmarsh, supra note 116 (discussing the investment by a
defendant in a plaintiff’s claim in the vacuum of his proposed class
settlement auction scheme and not in the context of investment
generally).
106
107
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therefore existing on both sides of the transaction.112 While
fairly nuanced, however, such a proposition is not unheard of.
In hostile business takeovers, corporate raiders (i.e. hostile
investors) purchase shares directly from individual
shareholders to circumvent negotiations with an unfavorable
board of directors.113 This allows the corporate raider (the
investor) to acquire an otherwise un-acquirable asset.
Analogously, when settlement negotiations break down in
aggregate claims, aggregate defendants may consider
purchasing portions of the lawsuit to force settlement or
mitigate risk at a more favorable cost. For example, assume that
Aggregate Class A sues Company C. Company C offers a $10
million settlement to the members of Aggregate Class A, but
due to the resiliency of class counsel and a majority of class
members, Aggregate Class A decides that it wants to take the
lawsuit to trial. Company C may approach risk averse
individual members of the class and purchase portions of the
class claim at the rate of its settlement, or below, to reduce its
overall exposure to negative judgement or to influence the
pendency of litigation from both sides of the claim. By creating
similar interests on each side of a dispute, aggregate defendants
can bypass the common law requirement of adversarial
adjudication.
Similar incentives exist for market competitors to invest
against aggregate defendants. Suppose a smartphone
manufacturer (such as Samsung) is sued for product
defectiveness. Market competitors (such as Apple) may seize
the opportunity presented by high cost, high profile aggregate
litigation to deal an economic blow to a market opponent.
“Competitors may have a legitimate reason to pursue a claim
against the defendant. For example, the defendant may be
engaged in slipshod practices that are negatively affecting the

Id.
This usually occurs after merger/acquisition offers have been
rejected by the board. See generally Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548
(Del. 1964) (as a representative instance of an attempted hostile
takeover).
112
113
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industry.”114 On the other hand, “the purpose of the suit may be
nefarious: a better financed competitor may see an opportunity
to drive up the defendant's costs through prolonged litigation,
or even to bankrupt the company.”115 As professor Tidmarsh
explains “In theory, abuse of process and antitrust laws prevent
[nefarious litigation,]116 but proving an illegitimate motive is
difficult and would consume significant resources.”117
To harmonize TPALF with the adversarial nature of
common law jurisdictions, professor Deborah Hensler suggests
that judicial oversight and the requirements of Rule 23(e)(3)
would deter improper parties from investing in aggregate
claims.118 Professor Hensler’s suggestion, although novel,
contains integral flaws. First, Rule 23(e) only applies to class
action settlements.119 If the aggregate claim is a non-class
action,120 or if it does not involve “settlement, voluntary
dismissal, or compromise” then Rule 23(e) does not require the
disclosure of funding arrangements.121 Second, even when a
TPALF arrangement exists in the context of a class action and
under the pretense of settlement, dismissal, or compromise,
judiciaries have no reason to suspect that an impermissible
funding arrangement exists, and no mechanism for compelling
disclosure of such an arrangement. The threat of post hoc
reprimands fails to provide a real reprimand for the discovery
of these inappropriate TPALF arrangements. Therefore, Rule
23(e)(3) fails to curtail inappropriate funding arrangements.
Because no regulatory effort has been made to
Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 258 (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)).
115 Id.
116 Id. (citing Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466,
472 (7th Cir. 1982)).
117 Id.
118 Hensler, supra note 49, at 515.
119 FED. R. EVID. 23(e).
120 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPALS OF LAW: AGGREGATE
LITIGATION, §1.02 (2010) (giving various non-class aggregate claims
including: derivative law suits, inventory settlement, and
bankruptcy proceedings).
121 FED. R. EVID. 23(e).
114
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safeguard TPALF arrangements from inappropriate
intervention, and because Rule 23(e)(3) lacks the inclusivity and
disciplinary authority to curtail the interposition of such
arrangements, the intervention of aggregate defendants and
market competitors into aggregate litigation lending
arrangements poses a considerable threat to the adversarial
nature of litigation in the U.S. 122

C. CREATING CONFLICTS: THE ADVANCEMENT OF NONPARTY INTERESTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE CLAIM
HOLDER (THE AGENCY COST PROBLEM)
The TPLF movement signifies an improved access to
justice for claimants and attorneys without the financial
fortitude to oppose deep-pocketed corporations.123 The TPLF
access to justice movement relies, to some extent, on the belief
that most attorneys have limited financial means and limited
risk appetites.124 TPALF proponents theorize that economic
incentives to settle “smother some potentially meritorious
claims in their infancy because lawyers are unable or unwilling
to front the costs required to pursue them in court.”125 Some
scholars have referred to this failure to achieve a claims
potential as the “agency cost” of aggregate representation.126
When a principal holds an asset and places it in the hands of an
agent, the agent may have an “incentive to maximize personal
profit rather than the profit of the principal.”127 In the litigation
context, the principal is the client, the asset is the legal claim,
and the agent is the attorney. Attorneys are presumed to settle
claims at lower negotiated values due to their own pecuniary
Id.
See generally Hill, Hensler, Tidmarsh, Kalajdzic, Lyon supra note 3
(for a list of articles referring to TPLF as an access to justice
movement); see also Carlyn Kolker, New York City Bar Gives Thumbs
Up to Litigation-Funding, NAT'L LEGAL NEWS FROM REUTERS, June 20,
2011.
124 Hill, supra note 3, at 486.
125 Id. at 500.
126 Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 233.
127 Id.; see also Hill, supra note 68, at 503.
122
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interests in risk laden claims. These “low-ball” assessments
occur to the detriment of the claimant. TPALF supporters
speculate that injecting third party investors/bidders into the
representational equation will incentivize the accurate
appraisal of aggregate claims and encourage meritorious claims
to proceed through litigation.128 While the accessibility of
alternative funding is admittedly practical, further
privatization of aggregate litigation finance would likely
amplify the agency problem characteristic in legal
representation.
By introducing a greater number of interests—let alone
nonrecourse financial interests—into the class funding
calculus,129 TPALF arrangements create a greater incentive to
settle at the lowest rate of profit. Aggregate litigation finance
parallels two comparable markets in the U.S. First, TPALF is
almost identical to the U.S. securities market.130 The New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ (an “over the counter
market”), and other securities exchanges provide a platform for
trading risk and reward for capital just like litigation lending.
Like litigation lending, securities trading ranges from safe
investments, such as an investment in government bonds,131 to
riskier investments, such as speculation in unproven start-up
companies.132 Regardless of the medium, both litigation
financiers and stock traders know “any sale that results in a
gain is a good sale.”133 Millions of stocks are purchased and sold
daily on the floor of the NYSE when it becomes profitable for
the investor.134 The reasoning is simple, stockholders generally
hold little more than a pecuniary interest in the security and
Hill, supra note 68, at 504; Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 240.
Supra note 48.
130 See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (unlike
litigation lending, the securities market is regulated).
131 Parallel to TPLF arrangements.
132 Parallel to TPALF arrangements.
133 Sham Gad, When to Sell Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA, July 7, 2017,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/10/when-to-sellstocks.asp.
134 Id. (this is called “day trading”).
128
129
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investors are not generally inclined to risk maturation when
profit is on the line.135 There is no reason to believe that
litigation lenders would operate with any less precision or
commitment to the fiscal “bottom line.”
Second, litigation lending is eerily similar to the payday
loan market.136 In the payday loan market, entities137 provide
funds to relatively unsophisticated people whose personal
circumstances are so strained that they find it attractive to
promise not-yet-received income for a reduced cash amount to
immediately help meet current needs.138 These loans often have
an interest rate of 40% or more.139 Litigation lending works in
an analogous way, targeting claimants and attorneys with little
to no capital (or desire for risk). These individuals are enticed
by the promise of up-front capital for a percentage of their
potential recovery/fee. Because these litigation loans are
nonrecourse and inherently risky, the lender can avoid usury
laws and recover a robust fee for their investment.140
Due to the pecuniary nature of TPALF arrangements,
litigation lending is more likely to exacerbate the advancement
of non-party interests, than any other form of investment in the
U.S. While the judicial agency problem is no doubt an issue for
See generally id.
Page C. Faulk, U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, Presentation
on Third-Party Litigation Financing (executive summary available at
http://www.wial.com/wwcms/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Litigation-Loans.pdf); See also Hensler,
supra note 49, at 501 (stating that “others have analogized this part of
the litigation financing industry to the subprime mortgage market.”
(citing Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime
Industry that has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83
(2008)).
137 See generally, CHECK INTO CASH, Inc., https://checkintocash.com
(as an example of just one pay day loan corporation offering cash
advances, title loans, and payday loans).
138 Hensler, supra note 49, at 501.
139 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Peter Eavis, Service Members Left
Vulnerable to Payday Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/service-members-leftvulnerable-to-payday-loans/.
140 Hensler, supra note 49, at 501.
135
136
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many litigants, attorneys are at the very least subject to the rules
of professional conduct and must operate within the confines of
their duties as a fiduciary to the claimant.141 Securities
speculators are subject to SEC regulation and oversight.142 And,
even payday loan lenders must operate within the confines of
usury laws and the oversight of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.143 TPALF operates with far less regulation
and without many of the restrictions placed on other forms of
investment. Its propensity to raise representational concerns is,
at least potentially, far greater than that of the current
representational financing model.144

IV. PROPOSING PROHIBITION
Many have praised the growth of litigation lending for
obvious, and some not-so-obvious,145 reasons. Before the
equitable principals of TPLF can be extended to aggregate
claims, lawmakers must address the elephant in the room—U.S.
law and TPALF are characteristically incompatible. Though
TPLF arrangements may require individual consent or
unilateral disclosure to cure most compatibility quandaries,
See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N
2016).
142 See generally SEC, supra note 145.
143 See generally CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov.
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TPALF would require a substantial rewriting of many ethical,
evidentiary, adversarial, and representational rules.
Unlike in Canada, where lending laws require the
disclosure of litigation financiers, theoretically curing the
privilege and confidentiality concerns intrinsic in aggregate
claims, U.S. law does not demand (or, in most jurisdictions,
even contemplate) transparency in litigation lending
arrangements.146 Distinct from jurisdictions where financing
arrangements exist as an alternative to contingency fees, such
as Australia, attorneys in the United States regularly rely on
contingency fees to recover their expenses.147 Similarly, where
other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., operate under a “user
pays” model of fee recovery, U.S. law typically uses an
attorney’s fee award as a punitive measure. Unlike in Canada,
Australia, and the U.K., litigation funding is neither congruent
with, nor necessary, to the operation of U.S. jurisprudence.
To harmonize TPLF with the incompatible components
of U.S. aggregate law, many practitioners and scholars have
proposed regulatory schemes and concepts to help bridge the
gap. Professor Jay Tidmarsh has proposed a class settlement
auction whereby investors bid against the defendant’s highest
settlement offer and if successful, stand in the place of the
claimants in pursuit of their claim.148 Professor Deborah
Hensler has argued that the concerns with TPALF are overexaggerations and that minor tweaks to U.S. law could account
for the totality of those concerns.149 Tyler Hill proposed a prelitigation sale of claim equity to combat the agency cost of
aggregate representation.150 While each proposal is more novel
than the last, none account for the risks associated with the
practice of litigation lending in the current unregulated
provisional period. As the CEO of a major litigation lending
Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 128 (distinguishing between
disclosure requirements in Canada and the lack of such
requirements in the U.S.).
147 Id. at 138-39.
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firm recently admitted, “there are valid questions to ask about
how [litigation lending] is used, and questions litigators need
to ask before they engage with a financier.”151 By engaging in
the unregulated practice of litigation lending, financiers and
loan recipients are merely converting the risk of adverse
judgment into the risk of ethical, evidentiary, adversarial, and
representational violations. Until a regulatory/legal structure is
adopted in the U.S. that accounts for the totality of the concerns
presented by TPALF, a blanket prohibition on TPALF
arrangements is needed to protect attorneys/claimants and
foster a healthy environment for aggregate litigation lending to
grow.
A comprehensive prohibition on TPALF arrangements
may seem extreme to proponents of litigation lending, however
pendency prohibition makes sense. First, temporary
prohibition assumes the eventual acceptance of TPALF.
Proponents of TPLF believe “there is no serious debate [that]
litigation finance is here to stay.”152 Many investment firms and
startups have waged substantial bets on the success of litigation
lending. By acknowledging the need for regulation, one
ultimately recognizes that litigation lending is a legitimate tool
of equity. Second, equity need not be sacrificed in the interim
between non-regulation and legal recognition. Risk-averse
attorneys and claimants may still rely on the existence TPLF in
non-aggregate claims, institutional non-recourse lending, law
firm lending, and other less institutionally offensive forms of
financing. Contextually, the prohibition should only affect
financing arrangements in aggregate claims and only for a
controlled period. Finally, the temporary proscription of
TPALF arrangements should motivate legislators and lobbyists
to develop a comprehensive strategy addressing the nonconformity of TPALF with U.S. law. By prohibiting aggregate
claimants and their attorneys from entering into third-party
lending arrangements until legislation catches up to the
practice, opponents and proponents of TPALF are encouraged
151
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to direct efforts toward influencing legislation where
determinations have a broad proactive influence, as opposed to
judiciaries where determinations are characteristically
retroactive and narrow.

V. CONCLUSION
In a society that recognizes the social utility of litigation
lending arrangements, the traditional normative concerns of
maintenance and champerty are contemplated with less vigor.
Where maintenance and champerty once stood, a system of
third-party litigation lending has grown. For many, the shift
represents a systematic balancing of the proverbial scale. For
others, litigation lending commercializes the practice of law to
the point of non-recognition. Regardless, extending TPLF to
aggregate claims exacerbates many concerns presented by
individual litigation lending and raises many new ones. This
article set out to answer the question of whether applying TPLF
in the aggregate context is worth the risk. It concludes that is
not worth that risk because litigation lending exacerbates
privilege and confidentiality issues; because of the ability of
aggregate defendants and other improper parties to circumvent
the adversarial nature of U.S. law by investing in their opposing
party’s claim; and because of the representational concerns in
advancing non-party interests to the detriment of the claimant.

